Intrenion

Pattern: Punishment asymmetry

Mistakes are penalized inconsistently, making risk assessment arbitrary rather than rational.

Situation

  1. In this condition, comparable mistakes within the same organization receive different disciplinary responses.
  2. In this condition, the severity of punishment varies across hierarchy levels despite similar operational impact.
  3. In this condition, some errors are formally documented while others of similar scope are handled informally or ignored.
  4. In this condition, employees cannot predict whether a specific type of failure will result in reprimand, career impact, or no action.
  5. In this condition, high-visibility incidents trigger rapid accountability actions, whereas low-visibility incidents often do not.
  6. In this condition, post-incident reviews sometimes focus on individual actors and omit named accountability in others.
  7. In this condition, enforcement intensity fluctuates over time, especially after audits, crises, or leadership attention.

Assessment

  1. This occurs because sanction criteria are not operationalized into binding thresholds that limit discretionary interpretation.
  2. This occurs because leaders retain authority over punishment decisions and apply it selectively based on strategic or political considerations.
  3. This occurs because outcome bias leads decision-makers to judge identical processes differently depending on the results.
  4. This occurs because organizations individualize failure to avoid acknowledging systemic design flaws.
  5. This occurs because high-value or scarce contributors possess bargaining power, reducing the likelihood of formal penalties.
  6. This occurs because informal networks filter information about mistakes before it reaches formal enforcement channels.
  7. This occurs because periodic external scrutiny temporarily increases enforcement intensity without changing underlying accountability structures.

Consequence

  1. Without a decision, risk-taking will shift toward political self-protection rather than operational optimization.
  2. Without a decision, error reporting will become selectively suppressed or delayed.
  3. Without a decision, trust in formal accountability systems will continue to erode.
  4. Without a decision, decision-making will prioritize visibility management over substantive performance.
  5. Without a decision, organizational learning will remain constrained by distorted attribution of failure.

Decisions

  1. We decide to document in writing the rationale, assumptions, and requested approvals for every non-routine decision we make because this gives us an evidence trail that clarifies accountability boundaries in advance instead of relying on informal verbal alignment in meetings, and accept that this will slow our response time and reduce perceived flexibility.
  2. We decide to decline ownership of outcomes where authority, resources, and sanction power are not aligned with our responsibility because this gives us clear exposure limits under asymmetric punishment instead of informally absorbing accountability gaps to preserve short-term harmony, and accept that this will create visible friction with superiors or peers.
  3. We decide to avoid initiating high-variance projects unless explicit evaluation criteria and failure thresholds are stated in writing because this gives us predictable downside exposure instead of proceeding based on assumed goodwill or past tolerance patterns, and accept that this will reduce our access to high-visibility opportunities.

Direct formulations

  1. I will document in writing the rationale, assumptions, and approvals for every non-routine decision before execution and will not proceed on verbal alignment alone.
  2. I will not accept responsibility for outcomes when I do not control the authority, resources, or sanction exposure associated with those outcomes.
  3. I will not initiate high-variance projects unless the evaluation criteria and failure thresholds are explicitly defined in writing beforehand.